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DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF EAPOL-START FLOOD ATTACKS IN LLN 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 








Due to limited resources in wireless sensors, such sensors are easily attacked by 
flood joining messages.  To address these types of challenges, techniques are presented 
herein that support making simple nodes (such as wireless sensors) "smarter" to allow them 
to identify malicious node(s) from legal neighbors.  Aspects of the techniques presented 
herein leverage, among other things, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over 
local area network (LAN), or EAPOL, protocol and employ, among other things, an 
EAPOL neighbor status profile, or ENSP.  A node may generate an ENSP for each 
connection rather than for each node based on a unique address.  After exchanging ENSPs 
with neighbors and then analyzing, a node may easily identify a malicious node and detect 
which is the malicious traffic. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely applied in many areas, such 
as, for example, smart grids, smart parking, intelligent lighting, environmental monitoring, 
health care systems, automotive industries, sports settings, open space surveillance, and so 
on.  Additionally, Field Area Network (FAN) development initiatives have been pursuing 
connected grid mesh network (CG-Mesh) environments for, possibly among other things, 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and distributed automation (DA) customers.  In 
support of the rapid development of FAN businesses the Wireless Smart Utility Network 
(Wi-SUN) alliance was founded. 
In such large-scale multi-hop and frequency hopping Low-power and Lossy 
Network (LLN) environments, the sensor nodes (SNs) should be authenticated by a remote 
authenticator and authentication server (by employing the Extensible Authentication 
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Protocol (EAP)-Transport Layer Security (TLS) framework, as defined by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 802.1x, and the IEEE 802.11i 
protocol) before joining the network.   
Furthermore, when a supplicant SN powers on it selects a neighbor as a reply proxy 
(RP) to send an EAPOL-Start message to the remote authenticator, which usually is a 
border router (BR).  The reply SN then forwards these EAPOL-Start messages as long as 
it receives them from requested neighbors.  A malicious node may attack the network 
through, for example, the following methods: 
1. It may send frequent EAPOL-Start messages to the selected RP with a randomly 
generated Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64) 64-bit electronic unique 
identification addresses, misleading the RP to forward the messages because it 
thinks the requests come from different SNs. 
2. It may collect the legal EUI-64 addresses from neighbors and then forge  
EAPOL-Start requests with those legal addresses to send to the selected RP. 
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Figure 1: EAPOL-Start Flood Attack Cases 
 
In practice it is difficult for the RP to identify the EAPOL-Start attack due to limited 
resources, such as, for example, computing power and storage resources.  Consequently, 
the RP forwards the traffic, hop-by-hop, until it reaches a BR.  The BR may identify these 
as false requests but by then it is too late to notify the relay nodes (RNs).  To make matters 
worse, the malicious node will often forge an EAPOL-Start message with different 
addresses (maybe legal or illegal), so these messages will, possibly among other things, 
consume much bandwidth and exhaust the energies of forwarding nodes as they are routed.  
The general solutions to defend against these attacks in other networks (such as Wi-Fi or 
wired cable networks) often focus on the following approaches: 
1. Check signatures. 
2. Set a detailed allowed list and then configure the same to each node. 
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3. Reduce the rate of forwarding EAPOL-Start requests. 
Unfortunately, the approaches that were identified above are not suitable for use in 
a multi-hop wireless mesh network based on the IEEE technical standard 802.15.4.  
Usually, the wireless sensor has limited computing and storage resources, thus it is 
incapable of performing any complex tasks like checking a signature for neighbors. 
Similarly, it is difficult to implement an allowed list in WSNs because most sensors are 
short of storage resources and consequently it consumes too much traffic to update the 
allowed list for each node.  Finally, the last indicated solution forces each possible RN to 
reduce the rate of forwarding of EAPOL-Start messages.  While that may address aspects 
of an EAPOL-Start attack it is not friendly to all of the legal EAPOL-Start requests.  For 
example, all nodes will send EAPOL-Start messages concurrently if the BR reboots or all 
of the nodes power on at the same time.  The legal nodes will spend a much longer time 
joining the network than before if this tough method is adopted. 
To address the types of challenges that were described above, techniques are 
presented herein that support a novel method to detect and defend against EAPOL-Start 
flood attacks in LLNs, such as Wi-SUN environments, which does not increase, for 
example, the overhead of device resources or the consumption of network bandwidth. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, below, when node X receives an EAPOL-Start message 
from neighbor node Y it could not know if it is a legal request or malicious attack. Thus, it 
has to forward this message to a BR hop-by-hop.  Finally, these requests are verified by a 
RADIUS server which then sends feedback to the BR for further operations. 
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Figure 2: EAPOL-Start Interaction in WSN 
 
For clarity of exposition, aspects of the techniques that are presented herein, and 
which are discussed below, may be considered through two parts. 
A first part of the techniques that are presented herein focuses principally on 
detection.  In essence, all legal nodes should experience the same maximum time for re-
transmitting an EAPOL-Start message.  For example, if node X is configured such that the 
interval between two EAPOL-Start messages is at least five minutes, then node X will 
detect an attack as long as it receives multiple EAPOL-Start messages from node Y in less 
than five minutes. 
Based on this, various rules may be defined for a legal node to detect an EAPOL-
Start attack in LLNs, including, for example: 
1. All legal nodes may be configured with one, consistent minimum time for 
EAPOL-Start message re-transmission (e.g., five minutes, 10 minutes, etc.).  If 
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a legitimated node receives multiple EAPOL-Start messages from the same 
node (i.e., with the same source EUI-64 address) those requests may be 
considered as attacks. 
2. In addition, if the RN could not identify the legitimacy of EAPOL-Start 
messages from associated neighbors, it could forward them to a BR.  Then, the 
BR returns the positive or negative feedback to the RN to tell it which requests 
are legal and which are not legitimated. 
3. Typically, a malicious node is fixed or immobile for a long period.  Thus, the 
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) between a legal RN and a malicious 
attacking node (like, for example, node X and node Y) is relatively stable.  If a 
node (e.g., node X) always receives a surfeit of invalid EAPOL-Start messages 
from different neighbors but all of them have a similar RSSI, it may consider 
that a malicious node attack through the forging of EAPOL-Start messages with 
different source addresses. 
A second part of the techniques that are presented herein focuses principally on 
prevention. 
As the result of detection, as described above, various policies may be defined for 
a RN to handle malicious or suspicious nodes.  For clarity of exposition, the various 
policies may be considered through two cases. 
Under a first case, a RN may receive multiple, identical EAPOL-Start messages 
(with the same source address) in a very short time period (e.g., less than a regular 
minimum retransmission time). 
In this case, there are two possible reasons: 
1. Only one malicious node attacks this RN frequently by using the same and fixed 
source address.  Its address is forged and invalid. 
2. The malicious node copies a legal EAPOL-Start message to attack the RN.  Its 
source address is copied with other another legal node. 
In order to know which is the root cause, the RN needs to complete a number of 
steps.  
In a first step, when the RN receives an EAPOL-Start request from a neighbor, it 
creates a profile for that neighbor.  A profile, which may be referred to herein as may be 
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referred to as an EAPOL neighbor status profile (or ENSP), may contain any number of 
parameters, such as, for example: 
1. A source address (e.g., EUI-64). 
2. An RSSI measurement. 
3. A frequency of EAPOL-Start requests. 
4. The number of expected transmissions (e.g., ETX) and/or other link quality 
metrics. 
5. A tag indicating, for example, legal, malicious, or suspicious. 
 
In a second step, both a unique source address (EUI-64) and an RSSI may be used 
to identify an EAPOL-Start request source node. If two similar EAPOL-Start messages 
(e.g., using the same EUI-64) carry different RSSIs (i.e., the difference of RSSI exceeds a 
specific threshold, such as 10 decibel-milliwatts (dBm)) then the RN will create two ENSPs 
for them respectively. 
As illustrated in Figure 3 below, the malicious node Y pretends to be legal node Z 
to send EAPOL-Start messages to node X.  When node X receives an EAPOL-Start 
message it checks the existing ENSP table with the EUI-64 source address.  If this address 
does not exist then node X will create an ENSP entity.  But if this address exists, then node 
X will compare the RSSI field.  If the difference of both RSSIs is less than a threshold (e.g., 
10 dBm) then node X will think both messages come from the same node.  Otherwise, a 
new ENSP entity will be created and both (i.e., the same EUI-64 ENSPs) will be marked 
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Figure 3: Illustrative Example -- Malicious Node Y 
 
As further illustrated in Figure 3, above, then node X checks both of the "frequency" 
fields. If there are multiple request times in a minimum period, that node MUST be a 
malicious node and node X will tag it as a malicious node.  The RN (i.e. node X) will reject 
all of the EAPOL-Start messages from the malicious-tagged nodes. 
In a third step, if node X could not identify two source nodes (i.e., node Y and Z) 
because both of their RSSI values are the same (e.g., perhaps they have the same distance 
to node X), it will think all attacking EAPOL-Start messages come from the same illegal 
node and then create only one ENSP. 
If node X simply decides to reject all of the EAPOL-Start messages with a EUI-64 
address of node Z that is not a desirable solution.  In order to avoid dropping a legal node's 
EAPOL-Start request aspects of the techniques presented herein support a novel method 
for an RN (e.g., node X) to identify such a circumstance. 
More particularly, node X may start a timer to block all of the EAPOL-Start 
messages from this node (e.g., EUI 1234).  When the timer expires, then node X may re-
check to see if the attacking persists.  If it does, then node X may double the blocking 
window (e.g., 10 minutes) until a pre-defined maximum value (e.g., 60 minutes) is reached.  
9
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Otherwise, node X may tag this node as "legal" and cancel the block timer.  This method 
may be referred to as a power exponent back-off mechanism for EAPOL-Start flood attacks, 
or PEBEFA for short. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, below, if node X blocks suspicious nodes (i.e., node Z 
and node Y) then node Z may turn to a candidate RN like node N.  Because node Z and 
node Y have a different distance to node N (i.e., their RSSIs are different) it is easy for 




Figure 4: Illustrative Example – Node X Blocks 
 
Alternatively, if node Z is able to select node X as a RN, it still has the opportunity 
to send EAPOL-Start messages successfully although node X may postpone the forwarding 
of same.  Because the RN (i.e., node X) just limits the forwarding of EAPOL-Start 
messages, if node Z receives an EAPOL-response from a BR it will enter Pairwise Transit 
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Key (PTK) and Group Temporal Key (GTK) progress and the RN (i.e., node X) will not 
limit these messages. 
Under a second case, a RN frequently receives a plethora of EAPOL-Start messages 
(with different source addresses). In this case, the malicious node pretends to be multiple 
different nodes to send a plethora of EAPOL-Start messages, with different EUI-64 
addresses, to the same RN (frequently through Case 2 that was presented in Figure 1, 
above).  However, all of these attacks have something in common, that is their RSSI fields 
of the ENSPs are the same because they are all coming from the same malicious node. 
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein a threshold may be defined to 
detect this kind of EAPOL-Start attack.   If one RN receives many EAPOL-Start messages 
in a short time (e.g., more than 10 messages in one minute), and all of them have a similar 
RSSI value (e.g., the different interval is no more than 10 dBm), the RN will mark them as 
suspicious in the ENSP tables.  In general, such a malicious node will not only plan to 
attack a single RN, it always tries its best to attack as many reachable neighbors as possible. 
Consider the illustrative scenario that is depicted in Figure 5, below. 
 
 
Figure 5: Illustrative Example – Node Y Attacks 
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As depicted in Figure 5, above, consider that node Y attacks its neighbors (i.e., 
nodes N, X, Z, and P) with a plethora of forged EAPOL-Start messages.  All of the RNs 
(i.e., nodes N, X, Z, and P) detect this suspicious behavior using the method that was 
described above and all of them record the RSSI value.  Under aspects of the techniques 
presented herein the RNs may exchange suspicious ENSP information with each other 
when they detect this kind of attack, allowing them to deduce the location of the malicious 
node (i.e. node Y) with multiple RSSI information.   
More particularly, and as illustrated in Figure 6 (below), node X knows the RSSI 
between node P and itself, the RSSI between node P and the suspicious node Y, and the 
RSSI between node Y and itself, allowing the node X to deduce the location of node Y.  
There are multiple known methods to support this such as, for example, the Distance 
Vector-Hop (DV-Hop) localization algorithm.  Similarly, node X may compute the 
location of node Y by using node N's information or node Z's information.  If these results 
are consistent, then under aspects of the techniques presented herein all of the RNs may 
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Figure 6: Illustrative Example – Node Y Location Determination 
 
In summary, techniques have been presented that support making simple (e.g., 
WSN, LLN, etc.) nodes "smarter" to allow them to identify malicious node(s) from legal 
neighbors.  Aspects of the techniques that have been presented herein leverage, among 
other things, the EAPOL protocol and employ, among other things, an ENSP.  A sensor 
may generate an ENSP for each connection rather than for each node based on a unique 
address.  After exchanging ENSPs with neighbors and then analyzing, a node may easily 
identify a malicious node and detect which is the malicious traffic.  Additionally, aspects 
of the techniques that have been presented herein support a PEBEFA mechanism. 
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